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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

Steven Leslie Williams

(Mr. Williams) suffered a lifetime

disqualification of his commercial driving privileges following
his second failure of evidentiary breath testing.

He was not

operating a commercial vehicle during either of the incidents.
This is an appeal from the District Court's Memorandum Decision
and Order affirming the Idaho Transportation Department's
lifetime disqualification.
B.

Course of the Proceedings

On June 12, 2010, Mr. Williams was arrested for driving
under the influence.

He failed a breath test for a second time.

At the time of the arrest he held a Class A Commercial Driver's
License (COL) and a Class 0 Driver's license.
On June 17, 2010, the State of Idaho, Department of
Transportation (the Department) served Mr. Williams with a
"Notice of Lifetime Disqualification" stating that the Department
records indicated that Mr. Williams had committed more than one
major offense as defined by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, 49 CFR 383.51, i.e., he failed two breath tests
after being arrested for driving under the influence on two
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different occasions.

Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code

§

49-

335(4) Mr. Williams' privilege to operate a commercial motor
vehicle was disqualified for his lifetime effective July 12,
2010.
On July 23, 2010 a hearing was held pursuant to Mr.
Williams' Request for an Administrative Hearing.
On July 29, 2010 hearing examiner Michael Howell issued
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order"
sustaining the lifetime disqualification.

The preliminary order

became final on August 13, 2010 and Mr. Williams filed a Petition
for Judicial Review with the District Court on September 8, 2010.
The issues were briefed by the parties and oral argument was
heard by the District Court on May 27, 2011.
On July 18, 2011 the District Court issued a written
Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the Department's final
order.
On August 26, 2011, Mr. Williams filed this appeal with the
Idaho Supreme Court.

An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed with

this Court September 14, 2011.

-2-

C.

Statement of Facts

On June 12, 2010, Mr. Williams was arrested for driving
under the influence.
second time.

He failed evidentiary breath testing for a

The arrest occurred while Mr. Williams was driving

a noncommercial vehicle.

R. at p.7. 1

As a result of the lifetime disqualification of his COL, Mr.
Williams has suffered significant hardship.

As a result of the

lifetime disqualification of his COL, Mr. Williams' employment
opportunities and ability to earn a living have also been
significantly limited.

See Affidavit of Steven Leslie Williams.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the decision of the Department made in violation of

the procedural due process rights of Mr. Williams?
2.

Was the decision of the Department made in violation of

Mr. Williams'

rights under the 5 th and

6t~,

Amendments to the

United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution?

On October 13, 2008 when Mr. Williams was arrested for
driving under the influence for the first time and failed the
breath test, he was also driving a noncommercial vehicle.
Mr. Williams will not pursue this issue on appeal.
-3-

3.

Was the decision of the Department made in violation of

Mr. Williams' rights under Idaho Code

§

18-8002A and the due

process and equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution?
4.

Was the decision of the Department arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion and/or in excess of the
authority of the Department because there

lS

no nexus between the

violation underlying the Department's action and the action
taken?
5.

Was the decision of the Department made in violation of

the provisions of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article If

§

6 of the Idaho Constitution

prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment?
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISQUALIFICATION IN THIS CASE VIOLATES DOUBLE
JEOPARDY

In 1995, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an administrative
license suspension under Idaho Code

§

double jeopardy. State v.

127 Idaho 700

Talavera,

18-8002A does not violate
(1995). Two

years after the decision in Talavera, the United States Supreme
Court in large part disavowed the cases and analysis relied on in
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Talavera and adopted the double jeopardy analysis In Hudson v.
522 U.S.

United States,

93 (1997).

Since the Hudson decision, the Idaho Supreme Court has not
held whether an administrative commercial driver's license
disqualification violates double jeopardy.

The Idaho Court of

Appeals has held that a one year COL disqualification does not
violate the double jeopardy clause.
Transportation,

151 Idaho 257

Buell v.

(Id. App. 2011).

Idaho Department of
However,

Idaho

Courts have never decided whether a lifetime disqualification of
a person's commercial driving privileges violates double
jeopardy.
The United States Supreme Court in Hudson ruled that the
correct double jeopardy analysis was the analysis as outlined in
U.S. v. Ward,

448 U.S. 242

372 U.S. 144

Inez,

(1963).

(1980) and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mart
In Buell, the Court of Appeals

agreed, providing double jeopardy review for a one year COL ban
under a Hudson analysis.

That analysis involves the following

steps:
1.

Determining whether the sanction is criminal or civil
by evaluating statutory construction and both express
and implied legislative intent; and

-5-

2.

Where the legislature has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty, a multi-factored inquiry

lS

used to determine whether the statutory scheme is so
punitive either in purpose or effect that it
transformed what was clearly intended as a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty.
Although the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code
§

18-8002 "is devoted entirely to the administrative, or civil,

suspension of the license of a driver" and "does not in any way
discuss criminal offenses related to driving under the influence
of alcohol.",

State v. Woolery,

116 Idaho 368

(1989), the Idaho

Supreme Court has not considered whether the lifetime ban under
Idaho Code

§

49-335 fits in that category.

It clearly does not

because a 90 day or even a 1 year suspension of a driver's
license has no similarity to the disqualification of a commercial
driver's license for the life of the person holding that license.
There is little legislative history on the enactment of
Idaho Code

§

49-335.

What is evident however is that it was

enacted in order to implement the provisions of 49 CFR part
383.51, presumably in order to come into compliance with federal
law to insure that the state did not lose federal highway
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funding.
§

While Buell held that disqualification under Idaho Code

49-335 was a civil sanction, that case was decided in the

context of one year COL disqualification.

It seems self-evident

that a lifetime revocation of a person's commercial driving
license is so punitive as to be a sanction that is criminal in
nature.
Citing Kennedy v. Mendozo-Martinez,

372 u.s. 144

(1963),

Hudson reiterated the following list of factors to be used as
guidelines during the second prong of the inquiry:
1.

Whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint;

2.

Whether it has historically been regarded as
punishment;

3.

Whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter;

4.

Whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment, retribution and deterrence;

5.

Whether the behavior to which the sanction applies
is already a crime;

6.

Whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it; and
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7.

Whether the sanction appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned.

See Hudson at 99-100; Buell at 1258.
However, "these factors must be considered in relation to
the statute on its face" and must provide "the clearest proof" In
order to override legislative intent and transform the sanction
into a criminal penalty.

Hudson at 100.

Unlike the facts in

Buell, the disqualification in this case is for a lifetime.

A

permanent elimination of the ability to operated a commercial
motor vehicle is far more punitive sanction than a year long
disqualification.
In this case, the analysis of the Hudson factors leads to
the inescapable conclusion that a lifetime disqualification of
Mr. Williams'

commercial driver's license is so punitive that it

is criminal.
A.

Whether Driver's License Suspensions Have Been
Historically Regarded as Punishment.

This inquiry differs from determining the legislative intent
regarding a particular sanction under the first prong of the
analysis. Rather,
Talavera,

sanctions can serve more than one purpose. See

127 Idaho at 704

(quoting Austin v. U.S.,

509 U.S.

(1993). Therefore, this factor requires looking beyond the
-8-

602

legislative intent to an inquiry of how this type of sanction has
been is historically viewed.
In Hudson,

the Court stated that "revocation of a privilege

voluntarily granted ... is characteristically free of the
punitive criminal element." 522 U.S. at 104. The Court held that
a banking industry debarment fell within that category.

Id.

However, such a debarment is very different from a driver's
license suspension in Idaho. Idaho courts have recognized a
driver's license as a right, not a mere privilege. Idaho's
Constitution, Article If Section 1 , states as follows:
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain
inalienable rights, among them are enjoying and
defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing
safety.
Further, due process analysis requires courts to "first
determine whether there has been State action" and then
"determine whether that State action deprives a person of a right
enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Gilpin,
Idaho 643,

649 (Ct. App. 1999)

132

Therefore, in order for a state

action to violate due process, it must violate a right of an
individual.
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In State v. Ankey, 109 Idaho 1 (1985), the Court found that
because the suspension of issued driver's licenses involves State
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensee,
driver's licenses may not be taken away without procedural due
process.

Id.

at 3.

In a concurring opinion. Justice Shepard wrote:
I suggest that neither of those cases provide any
authority for the validation of a statute which
authorizes the peremptory seizure by a field police
officer of a valuable property right without action by
a neutral and detached official, be it judicial or
otherwise.
Id.

at 6.

The Idaho Supreme Court clearly recognizes that a driver's
license is a fundamental and valuable property right and,
therefore, state action taking away that right is subject to due
process constraints.

Thus, because Idaho recognizes a driver's

license as a right, the suspension of a driver's license has a
punitive criminal element.
Apart from 18-8002A, driver's license suspensions have long
been a part of the punishment for driving under the influence of
alcohol and/or drugs, driving without privileges, vehicular
homicide, and minor in possession of alcohol. Therefore, based on
the fact that a driver's license is considered a valuable
-10-

property right and that driver's license suspensions clearly
serve a deterrent purpose and have been historically utilized as
criminal punishments, a lifetime revocation of a commercial
driver's license is criminal and violates double jeopardy.
B.

Whether the Operation of a Driver's License Suspension
Promotes the Traditional Aims of Punishment, i.e.
Retribution and Deterrence.

A lifetime driver's license suspension promotes retribution
and deterrence.

While Idaho Courts have not viewed driver's

license suspensions as punishment, the Courts have never
considered a lifetime disqualification in their analysis.
Buell.

As discussed above,

See

Talavera acknowledged that

suspensions under 18-8002A promote the traditional goals of
punishment.

127 Idaho at 703-705.

In addition, the Court stated

that the Department has acknowledged the deterrent effect of
license suspensions.

A lifetime ban is a permanent sanction and

clearly retributive.

Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of

finding a violation of double jeopardy.
C.

Whether the Behavior to Which the Driver's License
Suspension Applies Is Already a Crime.

The lifetime revocation is imposed when a driver has twice
failed an evidentiary test for alcohol indicating that they were
driving under the influence. Therefore, the behavior to which the
-11-

revocation applies is a crime under Idaho Code §§ 18-8004,
18-8004A, and/or 18-8004C.

This factor also weighs in favor of

finding a double jeopardy violation because the statute is
connected to multiple criminal statutes.
D.

Whether an Alternative Purpose to Which the Suspension
May Rationally Be Connected Is Assignable to it and
Whether the Suspension Is Excessive in Relation to That
Alternative Purpose.

This discussion combines the last two factors In the Hudson
analysis.
In Hudson,

the Supreme Court stated that it was improper to

"assess the character of the actual sanctions imposed.
at 101 (quoting Kennedy V. Mendoza-Martinez,

ff

522 U.S.

372 U.S. 144, 169

(1963)). This method of analysis is unworkable because it will
never conclusively resolve whether a particular statutory scheme
is punitive:
It will not be possible to determine whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause is violated until a defendant has
proceeded through a trial to judgment. But in those
cases where the civil proceeding follows the criminal
proceeding, this approach flies in the face of the
notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the
government from even attempting a second time to punish
criminally.
Hudson,
v.

522 U.S. at 102 (internal quotations omitted).

Young,

In Seling

the Court reiterated that an "as applied" analysis is
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improper because the nature of a sanction cannot be altered
"based merely on vagaries in the implementation of the
authorizing statute." 531 u.s. 250, 263

(2000).

Rather, the proper method of analysis is to consider the
second prong factors "in relation to the statute on its face"

and

not in relation to how the statute was implemented with regard to
a specific individual. Hudson,

522 u.s. at 100.

Therefore, in looking at whether the sanctions set forth in
Idaho Code 49-335 are disproportionate to the remedial purpose of
the statute, we must look at all potential suspensions provided
for in the statute and all the possible circumstances under which
they could be imposed.

In sum, this Court must look at what the

maximum sanction is that can be imposed, i.e., a lifetime
disqualification as happened in this case. See also State v.

McKeeth,

136 Idaho 619

(Ct. App. 2001).

In the present case, all of the factors support a finding
that the effect of a lifetime disqualification is so punitive
that it is transformed into a criminal penalty.
The revocation of a commercial driver's license can have a
significant impact on an individual's ability to earn a
livelihood.

Moreover, while a person has a substantial right to
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operate a motor vehicle and earn a livelihood,
right must be reasonable.

See Buell.

regulation of the

While a one year COL ban

may not be disproportionate to the goal of keeping problem
drivers off the roadways,

the permanent ban from operating a

commercial motor vehicle and maintaining a livelihood is
disproportionate and unreasonable.

Therefore, this action is far

more punitive in extent and impact than even the suspension of a
class 0 driver's license. This punitive aspect transforms the
disqualification into a criminal punishment for the purposes of
double jeopardy.

II.

IDAHO CODE § 18-8002 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
State v. Korsen,

138 Idaho 706, 711

(2003).

A statute may be

either facially vague in toto or vague "as applied" to a
particular defendant's conduct.

Id. at 712.

A statute is only void for facial vagueness if it is

impermissibly vague in all of its applications.

Id. at 711-712.

Therefore, if there is a core set of circumstances to which the
statute could be unquestionably constitutionally applied, a
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facial vagueness challenge will fail.

State v. Hellickson,

135

Idaho 742, 745(2001).
However, while a statute might not be facially vague because
there is a core set of circumstances to which it does apply,

it

may still be vague as applied to other sets of circumstances. See
Korsen at 711 712.
§

Mr. Williams is not arguing Idaho Code

18-8002A is facially vague but, rather, that it is vague as

applied to holders of CDLs such as Mr. Williams.
Due process requires that a statute defining criminal
conduct be "worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and
that it be "worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." State v. Korson at 711.

Therefore,

a statute is void for vagueness if it either "fail[s] to provide
fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or
fail[s]

to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had

unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute.

Id. at 712.

Although usually applied in the context of criminal
statutes, the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies equally well to
civil ordinances and statutes. See Cowan v. Ed.

of Commrs. of

Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247, 1259 (2006).
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"However, greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a civil
or non-criminal statute" under the doctrine. Cowan at 1259-60
(quoting Olsen v. J.A.

Freeman Co.,

117 Idaho 706 (1990)).

Therefore, in a civil context, a statute is void for vagueness
"where its language is such that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning," Id.
It is unclear whether the civil or criminal vagueness
standard applies to Idaho Code
116 Idaho 36S
§

§

lS-S002A. In State v. Woolery,

(19S9), the Court pointed out that Idaho Code

lS-S002 "is devoted entirely to the administrative, or civil,

suspension of the license of a driver" and "does not in any way
discuss criminal offenses related to driving under the influence
of alcohol." Further,

Idaho Code

lS-S002(5) states that a

§

suspension under lS-S002 or lS-S002A "shall be a civil penalty
separate and apart from any other" criminal suspension imposed.
However, while the suspension may be considered a civil
penalty, the statute as a whole may still be criminal in nature
for purposes of a vagueness argument.
§

First,

Idaho Code

lS-S002A is part of the "Crimes and Punishments"

section of the

Idaho Code. Also, in the preamble to legislation that was
eventually codified as Idaho Code

§

-16-

lS-S002, the legislature

stated that it "has tried to carefully balance the rights of the
individual who is accused or convicted of wrongdoing against the
rights of all other citizens." Beem v. State,
(1991)

l19 Idaho 289, 292

(emphasis added).

Further,

Idaho Code § 18-8002A provides definitions to be

used in the entire section,

including the definition of "actual

physical control" as used in § 18-8004.
Under either the criminal or civil standard, the statute
fails to pass the vagueness test when applied to individuals with
commercial driver'S licenses.

Therefore, Mr. William's lifetime

revocation should be vacated.
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(2) states that, at the time of
evidentiary testing for driving under the influence, the subject
shall be informed as follows:
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and
issue a notice of suspension and temporary driving permit to
you, but no peace officer will issue you a temporary driving
permit if your driver's license or permit has already been
and is suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a
temporary driving permit to a driver of a commercial vehicle
who refuses to submit to or fails to complete and pass an
evidentiary test;
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7)
days of the notice of suspension of your driver's license to
show cause why you refused to submit to or to complete and
pass evidentiary testing and why your driver's license
should not be suspended;
-17-

(c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing
and do not request a hearing before the court or do not
prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will be
suspended.
The suspension will be for one year if this is
your first refusal.
The suspension will be for two (2)
years if this is your second refusal within ten (10) years.
You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted permit
during that period, and
(d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing
and do not request a hearing before the department or do not
prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will be
suspended.
This suspension will be for ninety (90) days
if this is your first failure of evidentiary testing, but
you may request restricted noncommercial vehicle driving
privileges after the first thirty (30) days.
The
suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your second
failure of evidentiary testing within five (5) years. You
will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license
during that period;
(e) After submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when
practicable, at your own expense, have additional tests made
by a person of your own choosing.
(Emphasis added.)
In addition,

Idaho Code § 18-8002A(4) (a) states that upon

the failure of evidentiary tests:
[T]he department shall suspend the person's driver's
license, driver's permit, driving privileges or
nonresident driving privileges.
. for a period of
ninety (90) days for the first failure of evidentiary
testing under the provisions of this section. The first
thirty (30) days of the suspension shall be absolute
and the person shall have absolutely no driving
privileges of any kind. Restricted noncommercial
vehicle driving privileges applicable during the
remaining sixty (60) days of the suspension may be
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requested as provided in subsection (9) of this
section.

(Emphasis added,)
Idaho Code

§

lS-S002A(4) (b) (iv) provides that the notice of

suspension provided by the department shall state "the procedures
for obtaining restricted noncommercial vehicle driving
privileges."
Finally,

Idaho Code

§

lS-S002A(9) states:

Restricted noncommercial vehicle driving privileges. A
person served with a notice of suspension for ninety
(90) days pursuant to this section may apply to the
d~partment for restricted noncommercial vehicle driving
privileges, to become effective after the thirty (30)
day absolute suspension has been completed. The request
may be made at any time after service of the notice of
suspension.
. Any person whose driving privileges are
suspended under the provisions of this chapter may be
granted privileges to drive a noncommercial vehicle but
shall not be granted privileges to operate a commercial
motor vehicle.

(Emphasis added,)
The above-quoted portions of Idaho Code

§

lS-S002A are the

only portions of the statute that, either by positive reference
or by negative implication, specify any differences in the
administrative suspension rules for commercial versus
noncommercial drivers.
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In numerous places, the statute speaks generally as to
"driver's licenses" and "driving privileges," including when it
discusses suspension time periods. However, in four separate
places, including in the list of information of which a driver
must be notified at the time of evidentiary testing, the statute
specifically points out the difference between commercial and
noncommercial drivers with regard to the ability of the driver to
obtain restricted privileges. By doing so, the statute implies
that the only difference between commercial and non-commercial
drivers is that a restricted permit is unavailable for commercial
purposes. By not mentioning any other differences or, at the very
least, by failing to state that the driver may be subject to a
separate commercial disqualification under other statutory
provisions, the statute creates confusion and vagueness with
regard to commercial drivers.
"The
licenses

legislative
[took]

scheme

for suspension

into account the fact that individual drivers

have rights that must be respected."
289, 292

of drivers'

(Ct. App. 1992)

Beem v. State,

119 Idaho

(discussing Idaho Code § 18-8002

relating to refusals of the evidentiary tests) .

-20-

Further, the

preamble to legislation that was eventually codified as Idaho
Code

§

18-8002 stated, in part, that "the legislature has tried

to carefully balance the rights of the individual who is accused
or convicted of wrongdoing against the rights of all other
citizens."

Id.

1, pp. 368-69).

(quoting 1983 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 145, sec.
Therefore, the legislature felt it important

that drivers be advised of the true consequences of refusing
evidentiary tests,

Id. (emphasis added.)

Idaho Code

§

18-8002A was

later added providing notification of the consequences of taking
and failing the evidentiary tests.
150 Idaho 687

See also Cunningham v. State,

(Ct. App. 2011).

However, neither statute informs drivers of the true
consequences of refusing or taking and failing evidentiary tests

because neither advises drivers that there may be additional
disqualification consequences.

By carefully notifying drivers of

some suspension consequences, but leaving out others,
§

Idaho Code

18-8002A implies that suspension consequences included in the

statute are the only ones that the driver will face.
The rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius,
§

further supports the argument that Idaho Code

18-8002A is void for vagueness. Under that rule,
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"where a

constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation
of such things excludes all others." Idaho Press Club, Inc. v.
State Legislature of the State,

142 Idaho 640 (2006).

When

applied to the present situation, that rule of construction would
indicate that, because Idaho Code

18-S002A speaks generally of

§

"driver's licenses" and "driver's privileges" in relation to the
suspension time periods and only points out one difference
between commercial and noncommercial drivers with regard to the
availability of restricted permits, the logical conclusion is
that there are no other differences between the two types of
drivers.
By carefully providing notification to drivers of some
suspension consequences for failing an evidentiary test and by
calling attention to only one difference between commercial and
non-co~~ercial

drivers,

Idaho Code

§

lS-S002A implies that these

are the only suspension consequences and the only difference
between commercial and non-commercial drivers. Therefore, the
stature is vague as applied to Mr. Williams and other commercial
drivers because it fails to inform commercial drivers of ordinary
intelligence that they may suffer additional consequences.
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Further,

far beyond having to "guess at its meaning," people

of common intelligence would reasonably conclude that commercial
drivers will not suffer any additional consequences than will
noncommercial drivers other than the inability to obtain a
restricted permit.

Mr. Williams was not notified of the consequences of
submitting to the tests as required by Idaho Code
§

18-8002A(7) (e).

At no time is he informed that his commercial

driver's license would be disqualified for the rest of his life
before he took the breath test that resulted in the action taken
against him in this case.

Thus, the statute is vague as applied

to Mr. Williams.

III. THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND
IN EXCESS OF ITS AUTHORITY BECAUSE THERE IS NO NEXUS
BETWEEN THE CRIME AND THE PUNISHMENT
In this case, Mr. Williams was not driving a commercial
vehicle at either time that he was arrested for driving under the
influence and failed the breath tests.

Nor was Mr. Williams

using his commercial driver's license at either time that he was
arrested and failed the breath tests.
The action by the State of Idaho to disqualify Mr. Williams'
from using his commercial driver's license for life is a
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violation of his right to equal protection and substantive due
process of the law as guaranteed under Idaho Const. Art.
and the 14

I, § 13

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and

arbitrary, capricious and illegal because there is no nexus
between the actions by Mr. Williams and the actions taken by the
Department.
In Gibbar supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
In McNeely, this court considered a substantive due process
challenge to the ALS statute then in effect.
Substantive due
process, as guaranteed by both the United States and Idaho
Constitutions, embodies the requirement that a statute bear a
reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective.
McNeely, 119 Idaho at 189, 804 P.2d at 918; State v. Reed, 107
Idaho 162, 167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 (Ct.App. 1984).
When
legislation involves social or economic interests, it may deprive
a person of life, liberty or property only if it has a rational
basis-that is, the reason for the deprivation may not be so
inadequate that it may be characterized as arbitrary.
Sandpoint
Convalescent Servs., Inc. V. Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare,
114 Idaho 281, 282, 756 P.2d 398, 399 (1988); Pace v Hymas, 111
Idaho 581, 586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 (1986); McNeely, 119 Idaho at
189, 804 P. 2d at 918.
See also State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166 (2005).
In this case the application of Idaho Code § 49-335 to Mr.
Williams bears no rational or reasonable relationship to any
legitimate legislative objective.

When the underlying conduct

does not flow from impairment while driving a commercial motor
vehicle, a permanent disqualification does not meet the policy of
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removing impaired driver's from the road.

The taking of a

person's livelihood when the taking bears no relationship to the
conduct of the person is clearly arbitrary.
IV.

THE LIFETIME REVOCATION IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
AND AN EXCESSIVE FINE

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit the
imposition of excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments.
The lifetime disqualification of Mr. Williams' commercial
driver's license in this case is either an excessive fine,

cruel

and unusual punishment, or both.
In Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 142 Idaho
893 (Ct. App. 2006), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of excessive fines as follows:
The Excessive Fines Clause 2 limits the government's power
to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as
punishment for an offense.
United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2033, 141 L.Ed.2d 314, 325
(1998); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10, 113
S.Ct. 2801, 2805, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, 497 (1993).
Forfeitures
are payments in kind and, thus, are fines if they constitute
punishment for an offense, Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328, 118
S.Ct. At 2033, 141 L.Ed.2d at 325. A civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said to solely serve a remedial purpose,

2 "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. Amend. VIII
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but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment.
Austin,
509 u.s. at 610, 113 S.Ct. At 2805-06, 125 L.Ed.2d at 498.
Forfeiture of anything other than an instrumentality of an
offense is ipso facto punitive and therefore subject to
Eighth Amendment review, Bajakajian, 524 u.s. at 333 n.8,
118 S.Ct. at 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d at 328-29; United States v.
Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 814 (4~h Cir.2000); United States v.
3814 NW Thurman Street, 164 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9 t t: Cir.1999).
An instrumentality is the actual means by which an offense
was committed.
Thurman Street, 164 F.3d at 1197.
Additionally when determining whether a forfeiture is
subject to the restrictions of the Excessive Fines Clause,
courts consider whether the forfeiture is punitive in part,
not limited by the extent of the government's loss, and tied
to the commission of a crime.
See United States v.
$100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9 th
Cir.2004); $273,969.04,164 F.3d at 466.
The inclusion of an
innocent-owner defense in a forfeiture statute reveals
legislative intent to punish those involved in drug
trafficking Austin, 509 u.S. at 619, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125
L.Ed.2d at 504.
The lifetime revocation is certainly a forfeiture that not
only is not "an instrumentality of an offense" but is so
blatantly excessive because it is at least a partial forfeiture
of Mr. Williams' right to the pursuit of happiness through his
choice of employment and career.

Furthermore, if viewed as a

civil sanction, as addressed above, the license revocation only
serves a retributive and deterrent purpose, thus showing the
sanction is punishment.
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Similarly, in Reese, the Court of Appeals went on to
describe the process of determining what is excessive as follows:
The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionalitythe amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to
the gravity of the offense it is designed to punish.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334, 118 S.Ct. at 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d
at 329; United States v. Dodge Caravan Grand SE/Sport Van,
VIN # lB4GP44G2YB7884560, 387 F.3d 758, 762 (8 tL Cir.2004).
"Excessive" means surpassing the usual, the proper, or a
normal measure of proportion.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335,
118 S.Ct. at 2037, 141 L.Ed.2d at 330.
In Bajakajian, the
United States Supreme court adopted the gross
proportionality standard articulated in its Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause opinions for determining whether
in personam criminal forfeitures are unconstitutionally
excessive.
See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37, 118 S.Ct. At
2037-38, 141 L.Ed.2d at 339-31.
That standard similarly
applies to civil in rem forfeitures.
United States v. 45
Claremont St., 395 F.3d 1, 6 (pt Cir.2004); United States
v. Wagoner County Real Estate, Rural Route 5, Box, 340, 278
F.3d 1091,1100 n. 7 (10 th Cir.2002); Ahmad, 213 F.3d at
815-16 n. 4. Therefore, if the amount of the forfeiture is
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant's
offense, it is unconstitutional.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at
337, 118 S.Ct. at 2038, 141 L.Ed.2d at 331.
The inescapable conclusion in this case is that a lifetime
disqualification is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of
the offense and bears no relationship to the penalties imposed in
the criminal case.
In considering whether a punishment is cruel and unusual
under both the 8 th Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho
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Appellate Courts have identified a similar test to determine
whether a violation has occurred, i.e., by looking at whether the
punishment is so out of proportion to the gravity of the offense
and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable people.
v. Grazian,

144 Idaho 510, 517

Idaho 270, 275

State

(2007); Gibson v. Bennett, 141

(Ct. App. 2005).

The argument regarding a violation of the excessive fines
provision is equally applicable here.

The punishment is so out

of proportion to the seriousness of this offense (in part because
there is no nexus between the conduct of Mr. Williams and the
action taken by the Department) the conscience of reasonable
people should be shocked that a person who has failed a breath
test twice while driving on his Class D license should
automatically and without reservation have his livelihood taken
by the lifetime disqualification of his commercial driver's
license.
CONCLUSION

The decision of the District Court in affirming the
Departments decision to disqualify Mr. Williams for life from
operating under his commercial driving privileges is
unconstitutional and illegal.

The decision must be reversed.
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